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E3. 11and after this to honor beauty in the soul more than that 
beauty which is in bodies so that if a proper soul had even a 
little bloom, this would suffice for loving and caring for it, 
and to seek and bring into being discourse that improves the 
youths 11 ( 210b6-c3). 
R3. 11in order that he may be forced to behold beauty in practices4 
and laws" (210c3-4). 
R4. uand to see that all of these belong to tbe same kind11 (210c4-5). 
E4. 11so that he may show disdain toward the beauty of bodies" 
(210c5-6). 
RS. "and after the practices he should be led to the sciences so 
that he may see the beauty of these11 (210c7). 
R6. "and looking at beauty in the many, not with regard to the one 
instant like a servant c aring for the beauty of one child or 
man or practice, being a miserable slave limited in thought; 
but turning toward the wide sea of beauty, contemplating it, 
he would generate many beautiful a nd noble discourses and 
thoughts contained within philosophy11 (210c7-d6). 
R7. 11until thus strengthened and nourished he shall grasp the know­
ledge of the following sort of beauty (210d6-el). (a descrip­
tion of the Form of Beauty follows.) 
The following considerations support the reason-eras dichotomy 
of this scheme. The verbs in all of the R-s teps ( 11 realize 11, 11regard 11, 
11see11) belong to that standard vocabulary within which Plato usually 
describes the work of reason alone. The E-steps as I demarcated 
them, exhibit a more complex structure. They contain more than simple 
acts of love. Nevertheless, in El, E2, and E3 the verb 11love11 in 
various forms designates the key notion from which all actions and 
attitudes - some negative - contained in the steps are derived. The 
negative attitudes displayed toward previous objects of eros are 
clearly the result of the new positive reorientation of aspirations, 
and creativity seems to be dependent on the aspirations which motivate 
it. It is my construing of 210c5-6 as E4 that needs staunch defense. 
This step is entirely negative, and its ve�b, 
11� �. �()fj r. fXI 11 suggests 
the work Of reason rather t han eros, especially since it governs what 
I described above as R2. �e have to consider, however, the compound 
within which this word appears. This compound appears previously in 
210b6, in a section which seems to me to be a step of eros, and which 
appears in the scheme as E2. In E2 the 11showing of disdain11 is in­
extricably part of the erotic process of becoming a lover of all 
bodies. In view of this it does not seem to me implausible to repre­
sent the recurrence of a part of a previous E-step as an E- rather 
than a R-step. 
This defense of E4 rests on the discovery of parallels in the 
passage, and we shall now consider all parallels in general. �e can 
c1:L1.d.de the lower 2/3 of the path into halves, and a comparison of 
these yields the following 11 Platonic equa tion1:: 
\ 
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E l:Rl:H2:E2 equals E3:R3:R4:E4. 
The claim that this quasi-mathematical structure is intentional 
with Plato is hardly in need of support. The need is rather for a 
detailed examination of the similarities as well as the differences. 
First we note that the E-H-h-E pattern is common to both halves. 
The significance of this lies in the fact that it reveals a pattern 
of interwovenness between reason and eros which shows neither the 
dominance of one over the other, nor a simple cycle of love moving 
reason and vice versa (that would be the E-R-E-R pattern). Further­
more, we should notice that this division into halves corresponds to 
the first t wo levels of the ascent. Each half represents the sum of 
all steps taken on a certain plane. This shows that there is an 
E-h-R-E sequence on each level, and furthermore it shows that the 
transition from the first to the second level is the work of eras and 
not the work of reason; it is an E-E move, within our scheme. In 
addition to these general parallels a comparison of the corresponding 
individual steps reveals further striking similarities. Both El and 
E3 are positive steps of eros, and both initiate a sequence of steps 
on a certain given plane. Furthermore, both of these, and these 
alone within the first two-third of the path, are linked to acts of 
creation. I would like to claim also that both steps are manifesta­
tions of eros toward something particular, and not to something 
general. This is quite clear in the case of El, but might be dis­
puted in the case of E3. The first part of this step seems to be a 
description of a general preference of one kind to another. But it 
seems to me that reading this in conjunction with what follows, the 
key description is that of a man loving and caring for a single soul, 
preferring its b eauty, no matter how meager, to the possibly more 
vivid beauty o f  other humans on the physical and aesthetic plane. 
Along with these similarities we find also a significant difference. 
El is purely positive, whereas E3, since it involves a preference, 
is partly neg ative. In connection with this we should realize that 
E3 is the only step in the section which is 11trans-categorical11• 
Turning now to E2 and E4, we see at once that both contain a dis­
tinctly negative element, and that both complete a sequence of steps 
on a given level. The differences, however, are more striking than 
in the case of the other couple of E-steps. For E2 is only partly 
negative whereas E4 is completely so; and while E2 is negative toward 
something particular, E4 shows a negative attitude toward a whole 
class. I shall try to account for these differences below, as re­
vealing something about the difference between the first and second 
levels of the ascent. In general one might conclude that the E-steps 
seem to have roughly the same function in each of t he segments. 
This brings us to the comparison of the R-steps in the two seg­
ments. It seems to me that Rl and R3, as well as h2 and R4, perform 
roughly parallel functions. Both hl and R3 involve the contemplation 
of a plurality of related entities, and both R2 and R4 involve the 
discovery of some sort of unity within this plurality. R.G. Bury 
had probably this in mind when he identified the r ole of 11nous" in 
this passage as that of identification and generalization.5 This 
realization also places in proper light the relationship between the 
11ascent11-passage and the 11Divided Line" of the Republic . .  The mathe­
matical imagination used is basically the same, but the nature of the 
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of beauty on the spiritual level. This move is made possible by the 
previous conditioning of reason and it leads, in turn, to a further 
conditioning of 11nous". This mutual causal influence between reason 
and eros is s ignificant. It demonstrates on the one hand that Plato 
did not subscribe to the "reason is but a slave of the passions11 type 
of view. It shows also, on the other h and, that Plato was n ot an 
extreme rationalist in the sense that he did not regard the role of 
reason as consisting simply of repressing the erotic side of human 
nature. Indeed, this ballance between reason and eros raises some 
questions as to the nature of eros. For in the Phaedo as well as in 
other middle period dialogues this repressive and controlling func­
tion of reason is brought out. How are we then to think of eros in 
the §ymposium? In view of the above, one could hardly equate it with 
either the second or the third part of the soul within the trichotomy 
of the Republic. It seems to me equally clear that it is a notion 
much more narrow than our usual conception of 'emotion' which we con­
trast with reason. Finally, given t he mutual causal relations, we 
cannot regard eros as th� motivating factor underlying all burnan 
actions. On the positive side, however, we can say this about eros. 
It is conditioned by reason and is in turn conditioning reason. It 
is "trans-categorical11• Pinally, it is not mere love or desire, but 
affection toward something in view of the nature of that object. 
It seems t o  me not inappropriate to sum up the positive side of this 
account as showing that eros is what we c all 11 aspiration" as opposed 
to mere love or desire. One might venture to say that one of the 
crucial tasks of the Platonic 11paideia11 is the transformation of mere 
desire into aspiration. The crucial difference here is between tak­
ing something as a mere object of immediate satisfaction and t aking 
something as an object of satisfaction on account of its nature. 
The latter move requires the intervening of reason and may lead to the 
contemplation of that nature, a nd t hen to the development of a new 
desire which wi th the help of further intervening on the part of rea­
son will become an aspiration. 
Brief reflexion should convince us that there are a great var­
iety of aspirations, and that consequently eros, as interpreted here, 
is not one universal force; rather, the name 1eros 1 is used to desig­
nate a variety of impulses and processes which have the above men­
tioned t hree characteristics in common. In other words, I am sug­
gesting that eros is nothing "over and above" the sum of all E-steps. 
It is not a force behind the E-steps. This is not the usual way of 
reading this passage, nor is it the traditional Greek way of looking 
at concepts like eros. The l anguage of the hymns of praise in this 
dialogue suggests that eros is to b e  thought of as one force with 
many different manifestations. This is the way Plato's predecessors 
thought of all the 11daemonic11 forces wh ich hold sway over man. But 
on the basis of the interpretation given above I suggest that Plato 
poured new life into the traditional framework. According to the 
usually accepted version the ascent is a sort of ontological e levator, 
powered by eros, stopping at the various levels which Plato indicates. 
This interpretation either fuses the notions of eros and "nous'', or 
leaves eros as t he only motivating power. In either case, it repre­
sents Plato's psychology as something rather primitive. If, however, 
we view the various steps as events which effect causally one another, 
'"" 
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then there is no more reason for t he postulation of eras as an ad­
ditional entity, and we have in outline a psychological t heory which 
is complex, plausible, and accounts adequately for the variety of 
factors w hich relate causally to human action. The interplay of rea­
son and eros, as presented, is along the lines of t he principle of 
internal harmony which is stressed so much in the Republic. Thus 
eros stands simply for the wide variety of aspirations which Plato 
thinks of as the necessary accompaniments to the 1tlife of reason11 
which he envisages both as a moral ideal a nd as a scheme within which 
knowledge can be gained. 
To complete the interpretation of the lower part of the ascent, 
we have to deal w ith the acts of creation which are built into the 
pattern. In view of the fact that there are only three steps related 
to creation in the entire ascent, we shall deal with all of these; 
especially since it is my conviction that the interpretation of the 
"lower" acts of creation depends on how one takes all three of these. 
The path which precedes the perception of the Forms can be divided 
as moving on three planes: the aesthetic, the social, and the in­
tellectual. Each of t hese levels has one act of creation associated 
with it. The first two creations are linked with steps of eras (El 
and E3) and only the third one is part of an R-step (R6) thus sug­
gesting that only the t hird type of creation is a work of pure reason� 
Ye� all three kinds of creations are described as the creation of 
"AO�;.OS'" (210a8, cl, d5). It seems most likely that the kind of 
dis�ourse produced is intrinsically connected w ith the kind of step 
to which its creation is linked, with the level on which it appears, 
and with the degree of rational insight which the soul at that parti­
cular stage possesses. In the light of this consideration it seems 
best to identify the first discourse wi th poetry, the second with 
moral edi fication (of the type that Cephalus gives in Bk.I of the 
Republic) and the third with science and dialectic (this last identi­
fication is made explicitly by Plato in B6). 
The creation of discourse is causally dependent on the set of 
R- and E-steps which appear on any given plane. In addition to that, 
these discourses play a role in the causal chain which makes up the 
upward path. Attention to poetry may inspire love, but it can also 
turn the mind toward the characteristics of the loved object, and thus 
lead to the c ontempla ti on of aesthetic beauty in general. On the 
second level again, moral edification turns attention not only to a 
soul or souls, but to their nature; it is their characteristics that 
moral edification deals with, and attention to these characteristics 
can redirect eros as well as reason. Finally, it is hardly necessary 
to point out the influence that the third type of discourse has on 
the soul. In this manner the acts of creation play an integral part 
in the sequence which leads to the apprehension of the Form of beauty. 
The consideration of the acts of creation led us to a part of the 
upper third of the ascent. It is time to t urn all of our attention 
to this segment. There are three ways in which the upper one-third is 
different from the other two parts of the ascent. It is not intro­
duced by a positive E-step, nor are there E-steps wi thin the sequence .  
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Finally, the relationships between the R-steps seem to be different 
from those exhibited by the sequences of R-steps within the lower 
parts of the ascent. The first two differences are due to the entire 
lack of E-steps within this part of the path. Does this absence in­
dicate that the soul in these final stages is without eros? To con­
ceive of the beroe of this philosophic odyssey as a man without pas­
sion, 11apatbetic11, strikes one as utterly un-Greek, and such a con­
ception is also difficult to reconcile with the creation o f  philosophy 
(within R6) and t he 11 giving birth of true v irtue 11 ( 212a) vvhich Plato 
places within the last part. Bury, for one, insisted that eros is 
still at work in the last part of the path,6 but he d id not account 
for the absence of E-steps - indeed this way of phrasing the question 
can not be found in his writings. Now it seems to me that the pres­
ence or absence of E-steps do not determine whether or not there is 
eras in the soul; we may assume that Plato did not think of any stage 
of t he human life as utterly with out eros. V1ha t the absence of E-
s teps indicates in the upper part is that eras here no longer func­
tions as a guide. This explains also the difference between the other 
contestants w ho praise love as a supreme deity and Socrates who makes 
it quite clear that he is not doing this. He does not bestow upon 
love t he superlatives w hich the others failed to spare; he places 
love in the 11 intermediate 11 category. At the end ( 212b7-c3) he says 
that he praised eros 11as much as he is able to11 and he confesses to 
Phaedrus that this is the best he can do for eros, though Phaedrus 
might not even want to call this a hymn of praise. The irony of these 
lines is explained not only by the whole treatment of eros in the 
speech, but especially by Socrates' calling eros the 11best co-worker 
of human nature" (212b2-4). The 11phusis" referred to here is clearly 
reason, and e ros is aptly regarded as its b est helper. Eros can 
serve as a guide, b ut only up to a point. This parallels the treat­
ment of Virgil ln Dante's 11Divine Comedy". 
This explanation of the role of eros still leaves us wi th the 
question o f  how the 11trans-categorical11 move from the social to the 
intellectual is possible without E-steps. Certainly E4 does nothing 
more than turn the erotic from the aesthetic and physical plane to 
the spiritual. Thus while the t ransition from t he aesthetic to the 
social required eros, the transition from the s oci al to the intel­
lectual seems to be accomplished by reason alone. The explanation 
lies in the nature of the beauty of social rules and institutions. 
This beauty lies in the fact that social and moral maxims - for Plato 
the t wo are not separated - are founded on knowledge. Our understand­
ing of rules of action according to Plato is not complete until we 
see their derivation from the Forms. Thus it requires aspiration to 
move from the physical r ealm to that of the soul, but once we turn 
with 11care11 to the contemplation of the soul, our examination of its 
nature and e xcellences will lead us to consider rules of action, the 
sciences, and e ventually the Forms. 
RS represents one of the turning points of the ascent. For the 
beauty of the sciences according to Plato lies in their having the 
general and t he abstract as their subject matter. That which is con­
templated at t his stage is no longer connected to the particular and 
the c oncrete. Thus we could not expect the movement fro� R5 to R6 to 
, 
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be - in parallel with the moves from Rl to R2 and R3 to R4 - a move 
from instances to the general, or a move which enables one to see 
unity within a given class. Given Plato's conception of knowledge, 
the contemplation of its beauty leads one to turn away completely from 
the instance, the particular. And this is exactly wh at takes place 
within R6. This step provides the chief prerequisite for the ability 
to practice t he dialectic method; the "turning toward the wide ocean 
of beauty11, referring obviously back t o  the sci ences mentioned before. 
This "turning" is simply the determination to think in terms o f  gen­
eral concepts and not in terms of the empirical a nd the particular. 
The process of gaining adequate understanding of the general i s  the 
process of "creating" philosophy; an act of creation wh ich is linked 
with R6. How dialectic leads to R7, the apprehension of the Form of 
beauty ,  needs no explanation. 
This analysis of the ascent has shown us bow Plato combines in a 
single scheme a picture of the entire ontological landscape and a view 
of the educational process. We should not interpret the latter as en­
tailing t hat each human has to traverse the entire path. For those 
whose life is dominated by physical eros each of the steps is a neces­
sary condition for the attairunent of the next one. But the more 
gifted need not begin at the bottom; Plato does not rule out the pos­
sibility of t he young mathematical genius. It should be noted also, 
that for any given step the traversing of the previous steps is not a 
sufficient condition. �hat combination of factors within the soul 
are required f or progress is problematical; any answer here will de­
pend on what Plato took to be the imperishable part of the soul, and 
what this was is by no means obvious. We should remember here that 
the first step by itself indicates a c ertain degree of achievement. 
For El is not simply lust, but t he sort of love of the physical which 
is linked with poetry. Many people never arrive even a t  El. The 
progress from El upward is not merely a movement from certain fields 
of study to others, but a movement which leads to the appreciation of 
the beauty of various fields. For Plato this means at least partly 
that one has t o  see how all the fields 11point beyond themselves". 
The beauty of moral practice is that it can be justified on the basis 
of a priori truths, and this leads one to consider the sciences and 
dialectic which establish these t ruths. Thus the co nsideration of the 
various types of beauty helps to direct attention to higher and higher 
levels of k nowing. Each of the types of beauty is incomplete in it­
self; it is only with the final vision that we come in contact with 
the entity that is beautiful 11in itself". 
It is agreed by all that t he object of this final vision is the 
Form of beauty. The interpretation of the c haracterization of this 
Form, given in 2llal-b5, is also beyond c ontroversy. But we need to 
consider t he r el ationship between t he Form of beauty and t he objects 
of t he previous levels. The Form seems to be something hitherto 
unknown. Its perception is said to be that for the s ake of which all 
the previous labors were endured (210e5-6). On the other hand, the 
Form is also said t o  be that of which a ll o ther beautiful things par­
take (2llb2-3). The former description suggests that the Form is a 
s0preme, s tandard entity, standing alone, s eparate from all other 
beautiful things. The latter description suggests t hat it is somehow 
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a common denominator. �e might look for help to a suggestion made 
recently? according to which partaking amounts merely to approxima­
tion. It becomes clear, however, from 2llb3-5 that Plato does not 
have approximation in mind when he talks here about participation. 
For it is said that despite the participation the Form suffers no in­
crease or decrease. If partaking meant approximation, this statement 
would be unnecessary. It seems to me that Plato wants t he Form of 
beauty to be both a common denominator and a standard. This is by no 
means an inconsistent position. To say that the Form is a common de­
nominator does not mean that it is a 11compromise11 or 11mixture11 of the 
subordinate levels. It means rather that all beautiful things par­
take of it in some respect, and thus to some extent. The Form char­
acterizes these pluralities deficiently in the sense that nothing 
particular is beautiful without qualifications.8 
In this discussion it has been assumed t hat there is only one 
Form within the ascent, and that wh at one comprehends on the subordi­
nate levels are pluralities of particulars. This reading is sup­
ported by Robin's observation that whereas the ascent is gradual, the 
final vision comes suddenly9. Still, this is not the only way of 
reading the passage. One might t hink that wh at the soul comprehends 
on each level is a s pecies-Form. The object of the final vision is 
then a 11second-order11, generic Form of beauty which is above the 
Forms of Aesthetic, Social, and Intellectual beauty. The language of 
210b2-3 (R2) seems to support such a reading, and this view wo uld also 
bring into harmony the ascent with what is called in the later dia­
logues the method of collection and d ivision. Nevertheless, t his 
reading does n ot seem acceptable. The l anguage of R2 can b e  explained 
in terms of the language of R4. Moreover, aside from Robin's point 
there are two considerations which count heavily against this reading. 
One is Plato's summary of the ascent (2llc). In this summary Plato 
describes the movement of the s oul n ot as one from Form to Form, but 
as a r ise from one plurality to another, w ith the apprehension of the 
Form coming only at the end. The other consideration is the content 
of R6. Unless the perception of a Form came at the very end, one 
would be hard pressed to explain why the penultimate step should be 
the turning away from all i nstances. 
The account of the nature of the Form which was given above leads 
us to th e problem of self-predication. It is undeniable that accord­
ing to Plato the t erm 1beautiful1 can be applied in the 11fullest11 
sense o nly to the Form of beauty. The question which confronts us is: 
what sense does the t erm 'beautiful 1 have w hen applied to the Form? 
Vvhat is this 11fullest11 sense? It will not do to raise t he question of 
self-predication as the issue whether or not Plato believed that 
'Beauty is beautiful' is an a priori truth. It is possible that Plato 
was committed to a theory of self-predication without having been 
aware of it, or without having been able to formulate it clearly. 
The r ealization of all of the consequences of a metaphysical tbeory 
is a most difficult task for the philosopher. The crucial question 
is this: does Plato apply 1beautiful1 to the Form of beauty with des­
criptive force or not? Those w ho do not believe that Plato was com­
mitted t o  s elf-predication must deny that he applied 'beautiful' to 
the Form with descriptive force, and have to construe this word as the 
.. 
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proper name of the Form. Those who ascribe self-predication to Plato 
need to claim only that be believed 'beautiful' not to be a mere 
proper name but a term applied descriptively to the Form. It seems 
to me that the view according to w hich 'beautiful' is the proper name 
of t he Form of beauty is most implausible. For proper names, in con­
trast with descriptive terms, do not tell us anything about their 
bearers; they do not tell us what the bearers a re, they do not indi­
cate the nature of the bearers. To say of Mr. X that he is a fine 
citizen, a loving father, and a good l awyer is t o  say so mething about 
what be is. It is to describe him. But to s ay merely that b is name 
is John is not to say anything about him. It is merely to name him. 
There seems to be little doubt that Plato thought of termslO like 
'beautiful' as not only baptizing the Forms but also indicating their 
nature. This does not mean that these terms have the same meaning 
when applied to the Forms as when applied to particulars. It bas been 
said recently that once we recognize the ambiguity in Plato's use of 
general terms, the charge of self-predication disappearsll. This is 
a non sequitur. Terms like 'beautiful' may apply descriptively both 
to Forms a nd to particulars, but in different ways. This is indeed 
the case, V1·ha t may have tempted scholars into cons truing general 
terms as proper names of Forms is that according to Plato, any given 
general t erm designates uniquely one and only one Form. And yet, we 
should add, it does so while i ndi ca ting the nature of the Form. Thus 
we should s ay that general t erms apply to their respective Forms with­
out qualification, and it is only to Forms t ha t  t hey apply thus. In 
this way, applied to Forms, general t erms function for Plato as 
definite d escriptions. When furnished with the suitable qualifica­
tions they function as general d escriptions of particulars. 
So far I have shown only the plausibility of self-predication 
wit hin the theory of Forms. Let us now survey the e vidence wh ich 
shows t hat in the ascent passage Plato thinks of 'beautiful' as ap­
plyin� t o  the Form of beauty with descriptive force. In 210e4-5 
where Plato describes the object of the final vision he talks of it 
as "beautiful in nature11• This beauty is presumably indicated by the 
term 'beautiful' as applied to the Form; but it could not be if the 
term were m erely a proper name. In 2lla it is s aid that the Form, in 
contrast with the particulars, cannot be s aid t o  be both beautiful 
and ugly. Obviously, Plato is not ruling out the absurd possibility 
that both 'beautiful' and 'ugly' should be proper names of the same 
Form. Rather, be is concerned to say that only one of these descrip­
tions apply to the Form of beauty. Again in 2llb2 Plato talks of all 
the other beautiful things partaking of the Beautiful. Finally, it 
is worth-mentioning 2llcl-2 where t he many beautiful things with which 
we start the ascent are contrasted with this 11beautiful11 for the sake 
of which the journey is undertaken. Only the mo�t tortuous reading 
of the Greek will make a proper name out of "TOV K ou\�d' (2llc2) in 
this context. It seems to me that these passages present adequate 
evidence to support t he claim that in this section of the Symposium 
Plato is committed to s elf-predication. 
In recent discussions the notion o f  self-predication fares badly. 
Those who like Vlastos think that Plato held this theoryl2 speak of 
it with regret. Those who wish to 11defend11 Plato against the ascrip­
tion of this doctrine talk of it as "puerile confusion1113 Reading 
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these interpretations one might come to the conclusion that only in a 
moment of utter c onfusion, and possibly poetic madness, could a philo­
sopher e ntertain this theory. Now it would be useless to deny that 
self-predication leads to logical difficulties. On the other hand, 
it seems to me that self-predication performs a useful and much needed 
function in the theory of Forms, and that without it this latter 
theory hardly says anything at all. After all, t he postulation of 
the Forms and the accompanying epistemology are supposed to explain 
how we are able to describe and understand - as far as possible - the 
external world. Our ascription of general t erms to particulars is 
presumably in some sense a derivation or imitation of the proper as­
cription of these to the Forms. Our understanding and describing of 
the Forms is supposed to function as a paradigm of how we should under­
stand and describe particulars. But how could this be if general 
terms are merely naming t he Forms? Furthermore, there must be some­
thing within the nature of the Form that makes it the entity to which 
a general t erm can be applied without restrictions, in a paradeigmatic 
way. But if general terms do not apply to Forms with descriptive 
power, these applications can not function as standards from which all 
the other applications are derived. To explain our ability to des­
cribe and to understand by referring to unique, timeless, and immater 
ial entities which we can only baptize is to exp lain things only in 
the sense in whicb Moli�re 1 s good doc tor 11explains 11 t he capacity of 
opium to put people to sleep wi th reference to its dormitive power. 
Objectionable as it may be, it is self-predication that gives ex­
planatory power to the theory of Forms as we find this in the middle 
dialogues. 
In conclusion let us consider the 11end product" of t he ascent. 
With the Greek ideal of 11anJr kaloskagathos11 in mind we would expect 
the man at the end of the ascent to have assimilated all of the beauty 
of the successive stages, and to have arrived at a synthetic vision 
within which there is room for the aesthetic as well as the social and 
the intellectual. Indeed, this is how Stenzel has interpreted the 
final state of the soull4. Such a picture of harmony is hardly in 
conflict with Plato's moral philosophy. Nevertheless, this conception 
must be rejected, for it does not agree with the text. The negative 
steps of E2 and E4 indicate clearly that the successive stages are not 
to be incorporated into one another, b ut that each step and each level 
has to be transcended and abandoned as the soul rises gradually higher. 
The final vision is not an act of integration and coordination, but 
the intuiting of an entity not comprehended previously. 212a shows 
that Plato thinks of man in the final stage as being solely occupied 
with t he contemplation of the Form of beauty. As Robin has pointed 
out, there are many parallels between the development of life in the 
course of the ascent, and the description of the philosophic life in 
the Phaedo. This places the ethics of the Symposium together with the 
more ascetic writings of Plato. The reconciliation of this view with 
the doctrine of internal harmony w hich we find in other middle period 
dialogues is a problem that lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
University of Michigan J.M.E. Moravcsik 
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